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Objectives: We outline a two-stage heuristic account for the pathogenesis of the positive symptoms of
psychosis.
Methods: A narrative review on the empirical evidence of the liberal acceptance (LA) account of positive
symptoms is presented.
Hypothesis: At the heart of our theory is the idea that psychosis is characterized by a lowered decision
threshold, which results in the premature acceptance of hypotheses that a nonpsychotic individual
would reject. Once the hypothesis is judged as valid, counterevidence is not sought anymore due to a bias
against disconﬁrmatory evidence as well as conﬁrmation biases, consolidating the false hypothesis. As a
result of LA, conﬁdence in errors is enhanced relative to controls. Subjective probabilities are initially low
for hypotheses in individuals with delusions, and delusional ideas at stage 1 (belief formation) are often
fragile. In the course of the second stage (belief maintenance), ﬂeeting delusional ideas evolve into ﬁxed
false beliefs, particularly if the delusional idea is congruent with the emotional state and provides
“meaning”. LA may also contribute to hallucinations through a misattribution of (partially) normal
sensory phenomena. Interventions such as metacognitive training that aim to “plant the seeds of doubt”
decrease positive symptoms by encouraging individuals to seek more information and to attenuate
conﬁdence. The effect of antipsychotic medication is explained by its doubt-inducing properties.
Limitations: The model needs to be conﬁrmed by longitudinal designs that allow an examination of
causal relationships. Evidence is currently weak for hallucinations.
Conclusions: The theory may account for positive symptoms in a subgroup of patients. Future directions
are outlined.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. A two-stage theory of the positive symptoms of psychosis
The basic principles of the heuristic model of positive symptoms
in psychosis laid down in this article have evolved over the last
decade, starting with an article in 2004 (Moritz & Woodward,
2004). This manuscript will try to bring the pieces together.
While our theory hopes to provide a parsimonious explanation for
the formation of positive symptoms, delusions, hallucinations andoritz).
r Ltd. This is an open access articleso-called ﬁrst-rank symptoms (e.g., thought insertion; Schneider,
1959) by the same mechanism, our assumptions do not claim to
account for every single case of psychotic experience. With Bleuler
(1911/1950) who coined the plural diagnostic term schizophrenias
we concur that psychosis is presumably a multicausal disorder.1
Therefore, putting forward this theory does not refute or chal-
lenge prior cognitive theories (e.g., Coltheart, Langdon, & McKay,
2011; Davies, Coltheart, Langdon, & Breen, 2001; Fletcher & Frith,1 In keeping with standard nomenclature we will nevertheless use the singular
term psychosis in the remainder of the article.
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
2 Beads are drawn from one of two containers with usually opposing ratios of
colors (e.g. container A: 85% green, 15% red; container B: opposite). The participant
has to deduce by means of the sequence of beads fromwhich of the two containers
beads originate. Jumping to conclusions is usually deﬁned as a (premature) decision
after one or two beads.
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view aberrant input (rather than reasoning) as the driving process
of delusion formation, are considered powerful explanations for
overvalued ideas and autochthonous delusions (i.e., Jaspers wah-
neinfall: a sudden delusional idea that comes “out of the blue”
without identiﬁable preceding events) following a strong sensory
or neurological component (“surprising experiences demand sur-
prising explanations”, p. 360; Corlett, Taylor, Wang, Fletcher, &
Krystal, 2010). We will ﬁrst present our basic two-stage theory,
whereby stage 1 (belief formation) is at the heart of the heuristic
model. In this context, we present empirical evidence for its validity
and describe how our theory may accommodate speciﬁc (at times
counter-intuitive) peculiarities of positive symptoms (e.g., long
course until positive symptoms are full-blown, initial inconse-
quentiality). We then turn to stage 2 of the account, which explains
how delusional ideas may or may not evolve to incorrigible con-
victions, before discussing how existing treatments such as anti-
psychotic medication, as well as metacognitive and reasoning
training, exert their effect. While our approach highlights a cogni-
tive mechanism, we will explain why ameliorating emotion regu-
lation and improving mood may also be important for the
treatment of positive symptoms. This review will not cover genetic
or brain imaging data as our focus is in the cognitive processes of
positive symptoms. Another blind spot is that the review will not
deal with other prominent syndromes in psychosis like disorgani-
zation and negative symptoms. While our theory might be
extended to accommodate these symptoms, we will not elaborate
on this subject because empirical data are presently lacking.
We also would like to acknowledge the important contribution
of theorists like Daniel Freeman and Philippa Garety (Freeman,
Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & Bebbington, 2002; Garety & Freeman,
1999, 2013) as well as Richard Bentall (e.g., Bentall, Corcoran,
Howard, Blackwood, & Kinderman, 2001) and an early theory by
Christopher Frith (1979), whose models have been very inﬂuential,
especially for the second stage of our theory.
1.1. Stage 1: How false ideas enter and dominate consciousness
(belief formation)
Unlike a number of theories of the positive symptoms of psy-
chosis which posit that delusions derive as essentially normal ex-
planations from “out-of-the-ordinary experiences” (p. 181, Maher,
2006) such as hallucinations, neuropsychological impairment or
other erroneous input (Davies et al., 2001; Frith, 1979; Kapur, 2003;
Maher, 1999, 2006), or theories that conﬁne themselves to single
core psychotic symptoms such as paranoia (Bentall, Corcoran,
Howard, Blackwood, & Kinderman, 2001; Freeman & Garety,
2014; Freeman et al., 2002), we propose that, in a subgroup of
patients, the same basic pathological mechanisms are at work in all
major positive symptoms.
Picking up a metaphor used in one of our last empirical studies
(Moritz, Scheu et al., 2016), we regard as a key cognitive aberration
in psychosis that patients reason like “bad statisticians”, that is, that
they assign meaning and momentum to weakly supported evi-
dence. A central claim is that the decision threshold for accepting
hypotheses is lowered in psychosis; hypotheses that a healthy or
nonpsychotic patient would reject, or put on hold until further
validity checks are made, are accepted as possible (Moritz &
Woodward, 2004; Moritz, Woodward, & Lambert, 2007; Moritz,
Woodward, Jelinek, & Klinge, 2008; Moritz et al., 2009). Of note,
strange thoughts (e.g., people are making remarks about me;
feelings of being looked at) at times also occur in non-psychotic
patients. What distinguishes psychotic from non-psychotic in-
dividuals is the weight these thoughts receive and the reactions
they elicit (Lincoln, M€obius, Huber, Nagel, & Moritz, 2014).1.1.1. Empirical evidence
Importantly, we assume this mechanism to be general and not
conﬁned to delusional or emotion-laden situations. Evidence for
this theory comes from different lines of research.1.1.1.1. Plausibility scores for absurd hypotheses
A recent meta-analysis (McLean, Mattiske, & Balzan, 2016) on
parameters predominantly collected with the bias against dis-
conﬁrmatory evidence paradigm (BADE; Buchy, Woodward, &
Liotti, 2007; Sanford, Veckenstedt, Moritz, Balzan, &
Woodward, 2014; Woodward, Buchy, Moritz, & Liotti, 2007;
Woodward, Moritz, & Chen, 2006) suggests that individuals
with schizophrenia assign higher plausibility to interpretations
(verbally or nonverbally presented response options for a sce-
nario) that nonpsychotic individuals would reject as absurd.
This was typically examined using non-delusion relevant ma-
terial in order to avoid tautological inferences (for results on
plausibility judgements for delusional scenarios see LaRocco &
Warman, 2009). In our very ﬁrst study (Moritz & Woodward,
2004), which already outlined a sketch for the present theory,
we used ambiguous pictures from the Thematic Apperception
Test (TAT). While patients and controls did not differ with
respect to well-supported interpretations of presented pictures,
patients rated absurd scenarios as much more plausible than
controls. Interestingly, in patients who received higher anti-
psychotic doses, this patternwas attenuated (wewill turn to the
potential signiﬁcance of this and other psychopharmacological
ﬁndings later).1.1.1.2. Decision threshold for conclusions
Building upon experimental designs of Hausmann and L€age
(e.g., 2008), in studies analogous to the “Who Wants to be a
Millionaire” TV game show (Moritz, Woodward, & Hausmann,
2006; Moritz, G€oritz, et al., 2015), we asked patients and con-
trols to provide probability estimates to response options and
then asked them, whether they would make a decision or reject
any of the options/hypotheses presented, based on their sub-
jective probability estimates. Importantly, such judgments were
optional; even if participants were 99% sure, they were free to
make a decision or not. In other studies (Moritz, Scheu et al.,
2016; Moritz, Van Quaquebeke, & Lincoln, 2012), we adopted
variants of the beads task2 (Garety, Hemsley, & Wessely, 1991)
and asked patients after each drawn item for their probability
estimates, and again, whether or not they would make a deci-
sion. The “millionaire quiz” and modiﬁed beads task studies
allowed us to dissociate the point of conclusion-drawing from
subjective probability estimates and to determine the individual
decision threshold, that is, the probability estimate an individual
deems sufﬁcient for a decision/ﬁrm judgment. In these studies
(Moritz, Scheu et al., 2016; Moritz et al., 2009, 2012; Moritz,
Woodward, et al., 2006; Veckenstedt et al., 2011), we found
that patients based decisions on much lower probability esti-
mates than controls (e.g. 82% relative to 93% in Moritz, Scheu
et al., 2016) and this parameter proved a better discriminator
between groups than the conventional jumping to conclusions
3 Of note, a lowered decision threshold can not only explain why patients jump to
conclusions on the aforementioned beads task but also why they switch more often
to an alternative option than controls once contrary evidence occurs instead of
being stuck onto one option.
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(Moritz, Scheu et al., 2016), we could even detect a lowered
decision threshold which was correlated with more errors,
while the JTC bias was absent in patients.
1.1.2. The role of conﬁdence
A liberal decision threshold enhances chances of arriving at false
assumptions. This is why in statistics, for example, the level of
signiﬁcance for accepting or rejecting hypotheses is usually quite
strict and conventionally set at 5%, although this value is arbitrary
and in some consequential situations (e.g., diagnostic decisions for
severe disorders) even higher thresholds should apply. A liberal
decision threshold has important implications for conﬁdence in
correct and incorrect judgments. Once a decision has been made
and a judgmental gestalt is formed, the hypothesis is no longer
openly challenged. The search for alternative hypotheses is abol-
ished and inconsistent evidence is ignored; this response pattern is
almost ubiquitous ande albeit with a lower severitye even seen in
(nonpsychotic) academics (Fugelsang, Stein, Green, & Dunbar,
2004). Due to premature termination of the search process, addi-
tional valid cues for a correct hypothesis are not detected; even if a
psychotic individual eventually endorses the correct hypothesis, it
is held less conﬁdently compared to a non-psychotic individual
who has gathered more evidence and thus gains more conﬁdence
in the correct decision. On the other hand, the premature termi-
nation of the search process makes it more likely that evidence
against the wrong hypotheses is overlooked or de-valued (Moritz&
Woodward, 2006). As the search process in non-psychotic in-
dividuals is prolonged, they might still arrive at wrong conclusions
but with less conﬁdence (Patalano & LeClair, 2011). This is because
inconclusive cues hold momentous affective and behavioral con-
sequences in check via doubt (Moritz & Van Quaquebeke, 2014; for
a related argument see; Yu, Pleskac, & Zeigenfuse, 2015). This
pattern of results has been reported inmany studies (Bhatt, Laws,&
McKenna, 2010; Dore, Caza, Gingras, & Rouleau, 2007; Gawe˛da,
Woodward, Moritz, & Kokoszka, 2013; K€other et al., 2012; Mayer,
Kim, & Park, 2014; Moritz, G€oritz, et al., 2015; Moritz, Ramdani,
et al., 2014; Peters et al., 2007; Peters, Hauschildt, Moritz, &
Jelinek, 2013); the evidence was recently summarized by Balzan
(2016). In short, patients with schizophrenia display over-
conﬁdence in errors mostly in combination with lowered conﬁ-
dence in correct judgments, which results in “knowledge
corruption” (deﬁned as the proportion of high-conﬁdent responses
that are false). Interestingly, this overconﬁdence bias has also been
shown in participants at-risk for psychosis, or those with elevated
subclinical symptoms, and is thus not conﬁned to patients with
acute psychosis (Eisenacher et al., 2015; Moritz, G€oritz, et al., 2015).
However, we have noted that the exact pattern varies across tasks
(e.g., with task performance sometimes characterized by overall
overconﬁdence, or underconﬁdence in correct responses) and
seems to depend on subjective competence; a patient is more likely
to adopt liberal acceptance when he or she feels competent. This is
in accordancewith the observation that delusional ideas are usually
not random but relate to topics for which the patient has some
experience, (subjective) expertise or insight (Moritz, G€oritz, et al.,
2015).
Relating this evidence to delusion formation, we propose that
patients in stage 1 of the process are not necessarily different from
non-psychotic individuals in terms of the subjective probability of
their initial ideas, including ideas (i.e., grains) that later evolve into
delusions (see Fig. 1, upper panel). However, they assign more
weight/strength and validity to their hypotheses once these have
achieved a certain threshold, which is lower than in non-psychotic
individuals. These ideas are then deemed signiﬁcant (“This is
enough evidence for me”), are not rigorously challenged anymore(Fugelsang et al., 2004), and ﬁnally begin to crystalize as beliefs. As
outlined before, the chance of overlooking counterarguments is
high since liberal acceptance shortcuts the validating process.
A self-evident objection against this assumption is that de-
lusions are frequently deﬁned as conviction in false ideas (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Indeed, utter conviction is often seen
in patients and will be dealt with below when we turn to Stage 2
(belief maintenance). However, at least in the initial stages of
delusion formation (Klosterk€otter, 1992), patients have some doubt
(Jaspers, 1913), and studies adopting experience sampling meth-
odology (ESM) suggest that the severity and conviction of delusions
ﬂuctuate over time (Peters et al., 2012; Thewissen et al., 2011), and
are thus not always at 100%. Some patients rest at stage 1, partic-
ularly those with bizarre and rapid changing delusions or those
with so-called “double book keeping” (an expression coined by
Bleuler, 1950), that is, where two seemingly counter-exclusive hy-
potheses ﬂip back and forth.3 Delusions of the stage 1 type are also
the ones that are usually not acted upon and thus share some
resemblance with (exaggerated) religious beliefs (the at times un-
clear boundaries between religion and psychosis have already been
addressed by Schneider, 1928; see also McKay, 2004). Jaspers
(1963) noted the inconsequentiality of many deluded patients:
“With these patients, persecution does not always appear quite like
the experience of people who are in fact being persecuted…. Hence
the attitude of the patient to the content of his delusion is peculiarly
inconsequent at times.” (p. 105).
Acting upon a belief seems to be associated with belief convic-
tion (Bjørkly, 2002; Junginger, 1996; Moritz & Van Quaquebeke,
2014) and conﬁdence can still be low at this early stage. The
delusional idea is more like a working hypothesis and increasingly
absorbs the individual, a process that can take many weeks and
evolves over time (Kapur, 2003; Klosterk€otter, 1992).
1.2. Stage 2: Factors prompting conviction
Stage 1 cannot explain utter delusional conviction and the
maintenance of delusional beliefs. To explain this transformation
(i.e., enhancement of conﬁdence) and consolidation (i.e., resistance
to counterevidence), further processes come into play, some of
which have been previously described by other authors (e.g.,
Freeman & Garety, 2014; Freeman et al., 2002). We will refer to this
as stage 2, which will be subdivided into stage 2a (consolidation of
the primary delusional belief) and stage 2b (neglect of competing
hypotheses). Both stages are depicted in Fig. 1.
1.2.1. Conﬁrmation bias and bias against disconﬁrmatory evidence
One very important cognitive process for stage 2a is the
conﬁrmation bias (see Fig. 1, lower panel), that is, the tendency to
look for cues and facts supporting one’s hypothesis (Nickerson,
1998). While this bias has long been studied in healthy people
(Oswald & Grosjean, 2004), evidence suggests that it is elevated in
people with psychosis (Balzan, Delfabbro, Galletly, & Woodward,
2013). This process may be driven by a hypersalience of evidence-
hypothesis matches, where people with delusions overvalue and
attach excessive weight to hypothesis congruent evidence
(Speechley, Whitman, & Woodward, 2010). Another important
facet is the disregard of evidence that conﬂicts with one’s beliefs,
and a recent meta-analysis suggests that this bias against dis-
conﬁrmatory evidence (BADE) distinguishes patients with psychosis
Fig. 1. Upper panel: Stage 1. In individuals with psychosis, ideas are more easily accepted due to a lowered decision threshold (dotted line: threshold of nonpsychotic individuals;
full line: threshold of individuals with psychosis). In the example, nonpsychotic individuals pursue further only one (nondelusional) hypothesis. Lower panel: Stage 2. Stage 2a: The
delusional belief is augmented to a conviction by means of a conﬁrmation bias and/or emotional factors (see text) [A]. Stage 2b: Alternative hypotheses decrease in strength by
means of a bias against disconﬁrmatory evidence (BADE) and, for example, withdrawal/avoidance (lack of corrective experiences) [B]. Square: delusional idea; circles: nondelusional
idea(s).
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It has also been detected in high-risk ‘delusion-prone’ populations
(Buchy et al., 2007; Eisenacher et al., 2016; Woodward, Moritz,
Menon, & Klinge, 2008). The BADE further contributes to the sys-
tematization of the delusional idea as (challenging) alternative
scenarios are less and less contemplated (stage 2b). Isolation as
well as active social withdrawal/avoidance, which limit opportu-
nities for critical social feedback and corrective experiences (Fett
et al., 2012; Freeman et al., 2002; Zimbardo, 1999), are additional
fertile ground for the subsequent “delusional work” (Wahnarbeit)
as Jaspers named it (Jaspers, 1913).1.2.2. The role of emotions
Another important criticism seems at place. A purely cognitive
theory faces the difﬁculty to explain the speciﬁc contents and
themes of psychological disorders and their prevalent affective
tones (e.g., fear, depression). Why do patients arrive at ideas about
persecution instead of more peaceful ones? In linewith research on
anxiety disorders (Soares, Esteves, Lundqvist, & €Ohman, 2009), we
argue a threatening and emotionally charged explanation has an
evolutionary processing advantage and will receive more weight
than a neutral one, because, if true, it would be associated with
momentous and life-threatening consequences (de Jong, 2015).
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and individuals may get stuck with them because of their temporal
precedence, especially when such hypotheses are primed by
negative core beliefs following adverse events (such as bullying or
abuse) in childhood and adolescence (Bentall et al., 2014). Indeed,
ﬁrst hypotheses are generally judged as more plausible and
therefore have a higher chance to prevail (Moritz & Woodward,
2004), which is seen both in healthy subjects and patients, and
seems to represents a special case of the “primacy effect” described
for memory processes (Vinokur & Ajzen, 1982). Beyond that, we
concur with Freeman et al. (2002) that delusions reﬂect and pick up
the dominant emotional state. If a patient is anxious, a persecutory
content is more probable thanwhen a patient is in an elated mood.
In the latter case grandiose delusions will more likely occur.
Another potential mechanism for stage 2 should be mentioned.
An accepted theory is also more likely to prevail if it has a beneﬁt
and/or serves a purpose for the individual (Westermann, Cavelti,
Heibach, & Caspar, 2015).4 As already highlighted by founders of
modern psychiatry (Jaspers, 1913; Kraepelin, 1919), delusional ideas
often bring some “insight relief” (Kapur, 2003). Although the in-
dividual may feel persecuted and experience other unpleasant
feelings, he or she now “knows” his or her opponent, has an
explanation for previous emotional turmoil and often feels elated
because the alleged opponents are people or organizations of a
certain rank or power imparting the patient with importance in
return (Moritz, Rietschel, et al., 2016; Moritz, Favrod, et al., 2013;
Sundag, Lincoln, Hartmann, & Moritz, 2014). Religious or secret
service organizations are particularly attractive targets, because
these have the alleged power to induce the many disturbances a
patient usually suffers from. The greater the explanatory power of
the delusional superstructure the more stable it is. Moreover, if the
patient has a lot to lose if their beliefs turn out to be false (e.g., self-
esteem, structure, purpose), they might be more prone to disregard
counterevidence.1.3. Applying the account to hallucinations and disturbances of ego
boundaries
We will now turn to hallucinations and also brieﬂy outline how
the aforementioned processes, particularly liberal acceptance, may
explain disturbances of the ego boundaries (e.g., thought insertion,
thought broadcasting). This aspect of the theory is perhaps the one
with the least empirical foundation. As mentioned before, unlike
other models of psychosis (Davies et al., 2001; Kapur, 2003; Maher,
1974, 1999), we do not assume that aberrant sensory or sensual
input in psychosis is a necessary driving factor neither for halluci-
nations nor for the formation of most delusions (see also Bell,
Halligan, & Ellis, 2008; Chapman & Chapman, 1988), although it
may shape the content of the delusion. We concur with Morrison
(2001) that the main factor is a faulty interpretation of intrusions.
Having said this we again would like to acknowledge that “bio-
logical” models of psychosis may well explain certain important
delusional subtypes, particularly over-valued ideas or conditions
with a strong hallucinatory component (“out-of-the-ordinary” ex-
periences according to Maher) that are the brink of neurology and
psychiatry, such as Capgras syndrome.
At times, loud, alien, vivid and persistent intrusive thoughts
emerge in nonclinical individuals, too (Laroi et al., 2014; Vellante4 The related idea that delusions serve an “ego defense” function, that is, they
guard one’s self-esteem or lift it (Bentall et al., 2001; Lincoln, Stahnke, & Moritz,
2014) is currently not well supported (Galbraith & Manktelow, 2015; Mackinnon,
Newman-Taylor, & Stopa, 2011), which might be owing to methodological prob-
lems (Moritz, Werner, & von Collani, 2006).et al., 2012), and are very frequently observed in nonpsychotic
conditions such as depression and obsessive-compulsive disorder
(OCD). Approximately 50% of depressed patients (Moritz, H€ormann,
et al., 2014) and even 75% of OCD patients have intrusions of some
perceptual quality (Moritz, Claussen, Hauschildt, & Kellner, 2016;
R€ohlinger, Wulf, Fieker, & Moritz, 2015), that is, patients can
“hear” their inner critic or see upcoming catastrophes. Although
such phenomena are considered strange and somehow alien by its
holder, the nonpsychotic individual can still acknowledge
“authorship” (i.e., hold them for unreal and self-generated). In
psychosis, the same input is externalized and equipped with a
delusional superstructure. We found (Moritz, Rietschel, et al., 2016;
Moritz & Larøi, 2008) that the “voices” in patients with psychosis
are often not as acoustic, alien (i.e., appears as non-self), autono-
mous (i.e., beyond subjective control) and authentic (i.e., appears
like a real voice; the four A’s of hallucinations) as one would expect
from contemporary deﬁnitions of hallucinations. The main differ-
ence is that patients e according to our account e liberally accept a
bizarre explanation which externalizes self-generated phenomena.
Patients with disorders outside the psychotic spectrum ultimately
acknowledge their aberrant experiences as a mere “as if” feeling
(e.g., “it is as if there is someone talking to me”) due to their higher
standards for evaluating hypotheses (high decision threshold).
Psychotic patients, in contrast, contemplate the false inference,
which receives further impact and eventually prevails by means of
stage 2 processes. Of note, it is often easier to provide further evi-
dence in favor of a delusional explanation than for a medical one as
the true origins of, for example, loud thoughts, tinnitus etc. are not
well understood. Interestingly, delusions pick up the zeitgeist and
progress with scientiﬁc knowledge (Stompe, Ortwein-Swoboda,
Ritter, & Schanda, 2003); today, voice-hearers are no longer pre-
occupied with telephones as they were in the 1920s (Steinebrunner
& Scharfetter, 1976) showing that patients are able to refute hy-
potheses that have become utterly absurd. In many cases delusions
are not impossible but often just improbable by current scientiﬁc
standards.
The same mechanism may also apply for dysfunctions of ego
boundaries. For example, lack of attention resulting in derailed or
blocked thoughts might bring about ideas of a brain disorder, de-
mentia or paranoid content. Again, such “as if” intrusions are not
pathological per se but only if accepted and remain subsequently
unchallenged. Prominent other ﬁrst-rank symptoms deal with the
permeability of ego boundaries (e.g., thought broadcasting, thought
insertion) and thought-action fusion. While such symptoms may
indeed be considered bizarre, they are by no means conﬁned to
people with schizophrenia and are thus not pathognomonic
(Carpenter, Strauss, & Muleh, 1973). Some of these symptoms are
observed in, for example, nonpsychotic OCD patients. However,
unlike in patients with psychosis, such ideas are held in check by
doubt (feeling that one’s thoughts could bring misfortune to
others). The person with OCD separately seeks for an explanation,
which usually does not bring forward a delusional idea or if so, the
individual is usually able to acknowledge the absurdity of the
intrusion.
1.4. The role of (cold) neuropsychological dysfunctions e
aggravating but not necessary conditions
Neuropsychological deﬁcits increase the chances of false in-
ferences but do not represent a sufﬁcient or even necessary con-
dition for the formation of positive symptoms according to our
account. While neuropsychological performance dysfunctions un-
doubtedly exist in patients with psychosis (for reviews and meta-
analyses see Fatouros-Bergman, Cervenka, Flyckt, Edman, & Farde,
2014; Heinrichs & Zakzanis, 1998; Keefe & Harvey, 2012;
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multicausal origin and their putative speciﬁcity are subject to an
ongoing debate. Not all neurocognitive impairments reﬂect pri-
mary brain dysfunction but can be caused by the effects of medi-
cation such as anticholinergic agents (Vinogradov et al., 2009) and
benzodiazepines (Barker, Greenwood, Jackson, & Crowe, 2004) as
well as by distraction due to voice hearing and poor motivation
(Fervaha et al., 2014). We therefore regard neurocognitive impair-
ments as factors which can worsen the severity of the illness, but
are probably not causal factors. First, many studies assert that
positive symptoms are not correlated with simple cognitive deﬁcits
(Keefe & Harvey, 2012). Some theorists have even put forward the
idea that paranoid ideas require the capability of constructing
complex systems and that paranoid patients therefore have even
better than average intelligence (Frith, 1979). Moreover, many pa-
tients with other mental and neurological disorders who do not
display positive symptoms show neuropsychological impairments
of similar or larger magnitude. In addition, if patients are aware of
their compromised cognitive faculties (i.e., have good meta-
cognitive awareness; Balzan, Neaves, Denson, Liu, & Galletly, 2014),
momentous errors are not to be expected. In this case, patients will
still commit errors but will attach doubt to them (referred to as “not
trustworthy tags”; Moritz, Woodward, & Ruff, 2003).
2. Explanation why pharmacological and non-
pharmacological treatments may work
We believe that a central element of the treatment of psychosis
is to “plant the seeds of doubt”, that is, to get patients to reﬂect on
their judgment, decrease overconﬁdence in errors and look for
further evidence before making momentous and ﬁrm judgments.
Indeed, a new line of research shows that metacognitive (Eichner&
Berna, 2016; Moritz, Andreou, et al., 2014) and reasoning training
(Waller et al., 2015) decrease delusions and other positive symp-
toms at a small to medium effect size (Eichner & Berna, 2016).
Preliminary evidence suggests that this might be owing to
decreasing overconﬁdence (K€other et al., submitted) and raising the
decision threshold (Andreou et al., 2016) but the mechanism of
action is not fully elucidated and our hypothesis remains specula-
tive at this point.
Mounting evidence suggests that apart from emotional
detachment (Mizrahi et al., 2006; Moritz, Andreou, Klingberg,
Thoering, & Peters, 2013) one of the mechanisms of action of
antipsychotic agents, whose common denominator is a dopamine
receptor antagonism, is the induction of “doubt” (however see also
Mizrahi et al., 2006). This has been shown both at a subjective
(Moritz et al., 2013) as well as objective level in dopamine challenge
studies (Andreou, Moritz, Veith, Veckenstedt, & Naber, 2013;
Andreou et al., 2015). In line with these ﬁndings, several correla-
tional studies also found a relationship between the reduction of
conﬁdence and antipsychotic drug dose (e.g., Moritz et al., 2008,
2003) and less liberal acceptance under higher antipsychotic
medication (Moritz & Woodward, 2004). It deserves to be investi-
gated further why patients with acute schizophrenia generally
respond better than those with more chronic symptoms (Salimi,
Jarskog, & Lieberman, 2009). One reason might be that psycho-
logical motifs and processes (see above) are more relevant in pa-
tients with a longer duration of illness or more systematized
delusional ideas (typical for stage 2 in our model), which are less
sensitive to the effects of medication.
Recent research shows that working on emotional problems
may also reduce paranoia (Freeman et al., 2015). As described
above, a delusional idea will more likely gain strength and persist if
it is congruent with the person’s present emotional state, if it serves
an “ego function”, particularly to lift one’s self-esteem, and if itresolves ambiguity. In our view, removing emotional problemsmay
not strongly impact stage 1 delusions but may improve stage 2
delusions.
3. How does our theory relate to other accounts of positive
symptoms
As acknowledged above, some of our assumptions build upon
prior work. For example, our view of stage 2 positive symptoms
largely overlaps with psychological accounts by, for example,
Freeman et al. (2002). Stage 2 also bears strong resemblance to the
second step of the delusion theory by Coltheart (e.g., Coltheart
et al., 2011) which aims to explain how a delusion is adopted and
maintained; Galbraith and Manktelow (2015) already noted that
the second stage of Coltheart’s model is consistent with the
aforementioned BADE ﬁndings, where patients show resistance to
disconﬁrmatory data.
It is also tempting to link our account with early assumptions
made by Karl Jaspers (1963). Stage 1 delusions seem analogous to
what Jaspers referred to as delusional ideas that are not yet solid.
Many of these carry the character of autochthonous delusions, for
which the “bottom up” accounts of Maher, Coltheart and Kapur (see
above) present powerful theories. At ﬁrst sight, stage 2 delusions
seem close to Jaspers’ concept of “delusion proper”, in the sense
that the belief is held with utter conviction. A difference is that
Jaspers assigned diagnostic importance to bizarre delusional ideas
to qualify as delusion proper. However, bizarre ideas are often very
volatile (e.g., Dollfus & Petit, 1995) and therefore more typical of
stage 1 delusions (some bizarre delusions may be convictions,
however). Moreover, as elaborated above, stage 2 delusions in our
view are more than stage 1 delusions determined by psychological
(i.e., partially willed/conscious) processes contrary to Jaspers who
considered true delusions as “un-understandable”.
An even more parsimonious (one-stage) theory has been pub-
lished by Fletcher and Frith (2009) that tries to explain positive
symptoms by a single deﬁcit, deﬁned as a disturbance in error-
dependent updating of inferences and beliefs about the world
(i.e., an extension of Kapur’s ‘aberrant salience’ model). Although
this prediction-error theory has been viewed as fundamentally
different from Coltheart and colleagues two-factor model,
Miyazono et al. (2015) have suggested that it is possible to incor-
porate both approaches into a single theoretical framework. This
conciliatory strategy might overcome the inherent problems of
both theories when considered in isolation (e.g., unspeciﬁc nature
of the secondfactor; aberrant prediction-error signals are some-
times dissociable from delusions and the theory does not say much
about maintenance). The speciﬁc relationship between our account
and Miyazono’s incorporation of the prediction-error theory into
the two-factor framework needs to be tested further.
4. Open questions and future directions
While some parts of our theory are well established (e.g. over-
conﬁdence in errors), many pieces of the puzzle are still pre-
liminary and require thorough validation by independent studies.
For example, evidence suggests (see Lüdtke et al., 2015) that hasty
decision making waxes and wanes and that the decision threshold
may therefore be ﬂexible. We suspect that liberal acceptance is not
ubiquitous in patients with psychosis but may be aggravated under
deﬁned circumstances. One of these candidate circumstances is
stress. There is indeed some evidence to implicate stress and
emotional involvement in hasty decision making (Lincoln, Peter,
Sch€afer, & Moritz, 2010; Lincoln, Salzmann, Ziegler, &
Westermann, 2011; Moritz, K€other, Hartmann, & Lincoln, 2015;
Moritz et al., 2011) but independent replications are lacking.
S. Moritz et al. / J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 56 (2017) 12e2018Likewise, while we have not found any strong associations between
a lowered decision threshold and symptom severity, which tenta-
tively suggests that the parameter is a trait vulnerability marker,
more research is needed. Affairs are very complicated, as patients at
stage 2 often show overall higher probability ratings (Moritz, Scheu
et al., 2016) and therefore no liberal acceptance. Moreover, most
studies mentioned above highlighted the JTC bias which is related
to but, as argued before, is not the same as liberal acceptance
(Moritz, Scheu et al., 2016) - liberal acceptance may at times even
delay decision making (Moritz et al., 2007). Finally, as shown an-
tipsychotics may induce doubt and thus heavily confound experi-
ments examining conﬁdence.
More studies on the speciﬁcity of the BADE, overconﬁdence and
liberal acceptance are needed. It is unclear if these biases are
conﬁned to people with schizophrenia psychosis or also work in
patients with psychotic features but different primary diagnoses
(Gawe˛da, Mikuła, Szelenbaum, & Kokoszka, 2014; McLean et al.,
2016). To illustrate, we have to address the question if, for
example, the false belief (sometimes held with high conﬁdence)
that the individual might die or become crazy in patients with OCD
is governed by similar processes to delusional ideas in psychosis.
In the future, we also need to be more strict with respect to
terminology. For example, in some of our studies, we used terms
like decision and acceptance (thresholds), or probability and conﬁ-
dence, almost interchangeably. However, when individuals are
asked to make a probability judgment (on a 0e100% scale) for a
response option, this may provide different results compared to
asking the individual to judge whether they are sure or unsure,
because the latter judgment may merge the conclusion process
with a probability judgment (Balzan, 2016). A related methodo-
logical problem is that, if individuals are asked to provide proba-
bility estimates and make decisions, the two may not be as
independent as would be desirable (e.g., participants may provide
increased probability estimates once a decision is made; post-
decisional conﬁdence). We need new paradigms to verify the val-
idity of this distinction and to investigate the generalizability of our
ﬁndings. We must also acknowledge that we still do not know
under which circumstances overconﬁdence in errors e a central
feature of our theory e occurs and when it does not.
While our studies render motivational deﬁcits unlikely as ex-
planations for lowered decision thresholds, we must still entertain
the possibility that the proposed cognitive abnormalities are an
epiphenomenon caused by a hidden variable. As mentioned above,
we think it is particularly interesting to take a closer look at the
time course of decision thresholds and their moderators such as the
potential cost of false conclusions (e.g., patients are perhaps less
adaptive in their threshold whenweighing risks and potential costs
in case of false decisions).
We also think it is worthwhile to further pursue the hypothesis
that stage 2 delusions, in particular, involve psychological processes
that are amenable to psychological understanding. In our view,
neither a biological model deriving positive symptoms from aber-
rant input nor a pure psychological perspective attempting to
attribute positive symptoms mono-causally to biographical and
social factors (e.g., parenting, social exclusion) can solve the riddle
of psychosis.
We believe our theory has strengths and limitations. It provides
some testable assumptions and will hopefully bring the ﬁeld for-
ward, regardless of whether it is (essentially) valid or a stage-1
delusional idea itself.5. Declaration of interest
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